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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
the municipality has run its utility profitably and availed itself of the profit
it cannot improve the plant without violating the constitutional debt limita-
tion. It is questionable whether the interests urging this position are par-
ticularly sincere in their concern for the welfare of the municipality.
N. P., '34.
WITNESSES--CMPETENCE-MARITAL RELATION.-The defendant was con-
victed of conspiracy to violate the prohibition law. He called his wife to
testify in his behalf but she was excluded upon the ground of incompetency.
Held: Changed conditions have removed the reason for the old common law
rule disqualifying a wife from testifying on behalf of her husband in a
criminal trial. Funk v. United States (1933) 54 S. Ct. 212.
Various reasons have been advanced for the common law incapacity of
the one spouse to testify for the other. Among these the most important
are marital identity of interest, Jin Fuey Moy v. United States (1920) 254
U. S. 189, bias of affection, Johnston v. Slater (1854) 11 Gratt. (Va.) 321,
disturbance of the marital peace, Mary Griggs' Case (K. B. 1660) T. Raym. 1;
Kelley v. Proctor (1860) 41 N. H. 139. Certain exceptions were recognized,
generally on the basis of necessity. Turner v. Overall (1903) 172 Mo. 271,
72 S. W. 644; Tucker v. State (1882) 71 Ala. 342; McGill v. Rowand (1846)
3 Pa. St. 451.
Statutes, in one form or another, have been enacted qualifying the spouse.
The status of the rule in each jurisdiction depends largely upon the wording
of the particular statute. 5 Jones, Evidence (2d ed. 1926) 4010; 1 Wigmore,
Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 488. Statutory removal of the interest disquali-
fication not expressly extending to husband and wife does not remove their
disability to testify for or against each other. Lucas v. Brooks (1873) 18
Wall. 436; Fishback v. Harrison (1909) 137 Mo. App. 664, 119 S. W. 465.
The preservation of the marital peace remains as sufficient reason for the
retention of the rule. The clear tendency of the statutes, however, is to re-
lax the common law rule. See 5 Jones, Evidence (2d ed. 1926) 4010.
The previous words of the Supreme Court were exactly contrary to the
rule of the principal case. Hendrix v. United States (1911) 219 U. S. 79;
Jin Fuey Moy v. United States (1920) 254 U. S. 189. In overruling these
cases the Court justified itself by quoting that it was not precluded "from
examining this question in the light of general authority and sound reason."
Benson v. United States (1892) 146 U. S. 325; Rosen v. United States (1918)
245 U. S. 467.
Too often legislation has been the only source of legal advance. The basic
philosophy of the common law requires the judge to take consideration of
greatly changed conditions. Otherwise why the maxim cessante ratione
cessat lex? The "flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is the
peculiar boast and excellence of the common law." Hurtado v. California
(1884) 110 U. S. 516. See Benson v. United States (1892) 146 U. S. 325;
Rosen v. United States (1918) 245 U. S. 467. The tendency of judges, how-
ever, has been too frequently to adhere strictly to the letter of the principle
of stare decisis. When a court assumes the broader and more sociological
outlook some courage is shown even though the particular legal rule involved
is not of the greatest importance in itself and even though reliance is placed
upon past judicial utterances in an attempt to justify the position. If a
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frank recognition of the frequent legislative function of the judge could pre-
vail the legal system would profit at least to the extent of ridding itself of
meaningless and technical fictions and presumptions which more often than
not serve merely as a rationalization of the judicial intuition. See Cohen,
Law and the Social Order (1933). The position of the court in the principal
case signifies a more liberal tendency on its part; this is emphasized by the
fact that McReynolds and Butler, JJ., dissented. N. P., '34.
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